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We investigate a two-sided market model in which two platforms compete for sellers
and buyers who can participate in multiple platforms (multihoming), and one of the
two platforms can make exclusive contracts with sellers. The platform faces a trade-off
when it enters into exclusivity agreements with sellers, which gives it an advantage
when competing for buyers but reduces its revenue from the seller side. In addition,
we expect that the existence of multihoming buyers weakens the platform’s incentive
to have an exclusive contract with sellers. Even when buyers can multihome, does a
platform have an incentive to make exclusive contracts with sellers? If so, how does
exclusive dealing affect social welfare? We obtain the following results. First, in equi-
librium, the platform makes exclusive contracts with all sellers or not at all. If sellers’
network externality on buyers is sufficiently large (small), it chooses fully exclusive
dealing (nonexclusive dealing). Second, exclusive dealing is preferable (detrimental)
to social welfare when the network externality is sufficiently large (small). Exclusive
dealing encourages the multihoming of buyers, which allows agents to have more in-
teractions on one platform and prompts more buyers to obtain stand-alone benefits
from multiple platforms.
Keywords: Exclusive contracts, Two-sided markets, Multihoming, Platform compe-
tition.
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Competition policy for giant platform companies, such as Amazon and Google, is of inter-
est to practitioners and researchers.1 Such companies provide services that are essential
to our daily lives and have a substantial dominance in markets. To consolidate their dom-
inant position, platforms use a variety of conducts, one of which is exclusive contracts.
Exclusive contracts or exclusivity requirements are traditional practices that have been
observed not only in platform markets but also in conventional vertically related markets.
In the contracts, a (dominant) firm prohibits its counterparties or customers from dealing
with its rival firms in order to take advantage of competition. Examples of exclusive sup-
ply of goods in platforms include applications available on either Windows or Mac, game
software that is only available on certain game consoles, artists who only distribute their
music through certain music subscription services, and restaurants that only deal with
certain delivery services.2
The impact of exclusive dealing on competition and welfare has long been an impor-
tant topic in economics. First, in a simple vertically related market setting, the Chicago
School (see Posner, 1976 and Bork, 1978) argued that exclusive contracts need not be of
concern because they cannot prevent the entry of a more efficient entrant. Since then,
many studies have challenged or supported that claim.3 Armstrong and Wright (2007) is
the pioneering work that examines exclusive dealing in a two-sided market model. They
find that exclusive contracts have a significant impact on market outcomes in two-sided
markets. First, exclusive contracts may improve welfare by bringing agents together on
a single platform and allowing them to enjoy more interactions. When the degree of
differentiation between platforms is small, exclusive contracts are welfare-enhancing. Sec-
ond, whether agents can participate in multiple platforms or not will change the welfare
consequences. In particular, in a competitive bottleneck setting, Armstrong and Wright
(2007) show that exclusive contracts influence the distribution of the surplus dramatically;
exclusive contracts improve the surplus of agents on the potential multihoming side (say
seller side) who are fully exploited without exclusive agreements and diminish that of the
singlehoming side (say buyer side).
1The application of economics to the regulation of platforms is discussed in, e.g., Evans and Schmalensee
(2015) and Katz (2019).
2Examples of exclusive dealing in two-sided markets are introduced in Carroni et al. (2021). The legal
cases in which exclusivity agreements have been dealt with are summarized in chapter 5 in OECD (2018).
3For more recent studies on exclusive contracts, see, e.g., Calzolari and Denicolò (2013, 2015), Kitamura
et al. (2018), and Liu and Meng (2021).
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Although exclusive contracts in two-sided markets and their effect on welfare have
been analyzed since Armstrong and Wright (2007), the case where agents on both sides
can multihome has not yet been explored. This paper aims to fill this gap by studying a
platform’s optimal choice regarding the number of sellers to offer exclusive contracts under
assumptions under which (i) both sellers and buyers can multihome, and (ii) platforms
are differentiated both from sellers’ and buyers’ points of view.
These two assumptions are crucial elements of our model. First, we allow agents
on both sides to participate in multiple platforms. Most previous studies on exclusive
contracts in two-sided markets adopt a competitive bottleneck setting, in which platforms
offer exclusive contracts to sellers who can join multiple platforms, and buyers choose
one platform to join. However, in reality, there are increasingly more markets where
multihoming is possible on the buyer side as well as the seller side. Consumers may have
apps for both delivery services Uber Eats and DoorDash on their smartphones, they may
subscribe to both video streaming sites, Prime video and Netflix, buy both Nintendo and
Sony game consoles, and own both Mac and Windows computers. Second, we assume
platforms are differentiated from sellers’ points of view in addition to those of buyers.
In previous studies, sellers regard platforms as undifferentiated, and this intensifies the
competition for sellers between platforms. However, in practice, game software developers
will choose game consoles that have appropriate and preferable performance for each
software, and restaurants will recognize the value of tools (e.g., apps that deal with orders
and marketing information) available to manage delivery services. These two assumptions
may affect the incentive of platforms to make exclusive contracts. Specifically, both appear
to make exclusive contracts less attractive for platforms because the demands of sellers and
buyers are now less elastic. We analyze whether platforms will still implement exclusive
dealing in such a situation and the impact on social welfare.
Under these assumptions, we consider the following three-stage game. In the first
stage, one of the two competing platforms presents an offer of an exclusive contract to an
arbitrary number of sellers, and the sellers who receive the offer decide whether to accept
or decline it. In the second stage, the platforms set participation fees to sellers not under
exclusive contracts, and they decide which platform(s) to join. In the third stage, the
platforms set participation fees to buyers, and they decide the platform(s) to join.
We specify the platform’s optimal choice regarding the number of sellers to which it
offers exclusive contracts. We also identify the conditions under which a platform makes
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exclusive contracts. Our findings are as follows. First, a platform can enter into exclusive
agreement contracts with all sellers (fully exclusive dealing) or none at all (nonexclusive
dealing). It chooses fully exclusive dealing when the indirect network externality on buyers
is large and nonexclusive dealing when small. When it is mid-level, the platform’s choice
depends on the intrinsic benefits from joining platforms that buyers and sellers obtain. If
sellers’ intrinsic benefit is relatively low and that of buyers is relatively high, fully exclusive
dealing is implemented. If the converse is true, then nonexclusive dealing is selected. This
implies that a platform offers exclusive contracts to all sellers if the revenue from the buyer
side is expected to be somewhat higher than the revenue from the seller side; otherwise,
it will not offer any exclusive contacts.
We also demonstrate that full exclusivity may increase both total surplus and consumer
surplus compared with nonexclusive dealing. Specifically, when the indirect network ex-
ternality on buyers is relatively large, the total surplus and consumer surplus are improved
by fully exclusive dealing. The mechanism for welfare-enhancing exclusivity is as follows.
When exclusive dealing is introduced, and all sellers are gathered on one platform, more
buyers select multihoming. As a whole, the platform mediates more interactions between
the two sides and generates more network benefits and intrinsic values. Of course, it may
also increase total transportation costs and raise prices on the buyers’ side. If sellers’
network externality on buyers is sufficiently large, then the welfare-enhancing effects out-
weigh the detrimental effects in terms of total surplus as well as consumer surplus, and
vice versa.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.1 surveys the related lit-
erature. Section 2 introduces our settings. Section 3 analyzes the game and shows the
results. Section 4 explores the impact of exclusive dealing on consumer surplus and social
welfare. Section 5 offers concluding remarks.4
1.1 Related Literature
This paper mainly relates to two strands of the literature. The first concerns exclusive
dealing/contracts in two-sided markets.5 By developing the model of seminal works on two-
sided markets (Armstrong, 2006; Caillaud and Jullien, 2001, 2003; Rochet and Tirole, 2003,
4The Mathematica file that includes all equilibrium results and mathematical proofs is available upon
request.
5Some empirical studies deal with exclusive dealing in two-sided markets (Corts and Lederman, 2009;
Landsman and Stremersch, 2011; Lee, 2013). For example, Lee (2013) estimates that the ban on exclusive
dealing would increase hardware and software sales and improve consumer welfare.
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2006), the achievability of exclusive dealing in two-sided markets and its welfare impacts
have been examined in several papers. First, Armstrong and Wright (2007), adopting
the competitive bottleneck model of Armstrong (2006), show that exclusive contracts
enable a platform to attract all agents who can potentially multihome and foreclose its
rival platform. They conclude that exclusive contracts reverse the welfare consequence
in the competitive bottleneck equilibrium; agents on the potential multihoming side gain
all the surplus. On the other hand, agents on the singlehoming side are fully extracted
in the equilibrium of the exclusive contracts. Armstrong and Wright (2007) assume that
platforms utilize price structures to induce exclusivity on agents; platforms set outrageous
prices for multihomers and set reasonable prices for singlehomers.
Hagiu and Lee (2011) and Chica and Tamayo (2021) also assume this indirect manner
of exclusive contracts and analyze exclusive dealing in two-sided markets. Chica and
Tamayo (2021) construct a model where there are n ≥ 2 differentiated platforms competing
for sellers and buyers who have random utility functions. Notably, they show that, to
soften the competition, platforms offer nonexclusive contracts to some sellers in addition
to offering exclusive agreements to others in equilibrium. This is the opposite result to ours,
where nonexclusive contracts or fully exclusive contracts are chosen in equilibrium. The
direct manner of exclusive contracts is assumed in Brühn and Götz (2018) and Chowdhury
and Martin (2017). Brühn and Götz (2018) allow one of two platforms to make exclusive
offers to endogenous numbers of sellers before platforms move to pricing stages, which
corresponds to our setting. They reveal that exclusive contracts are profitable for the
platform that can offer them and detrimental to social welfare when competition between
platforms is intense. The present paper differs from theirs in that we assume platforms
charge fees on both sides of the market, whereas they assume buyers can join platforms
for free.
The above papers assume that agents on one side multihome and agents on the other
side singlehome. Doganoglu and Wright (2010) allow both sides to multihome, and show
that exclusive contracts enable an incumbent to foreclose a more efficient entrant. They
assume there is no horizontal differentiation between platforms and buyers do not derive
stand-alone utility from platforms. Therefore, when the incumbent corrals the sellers, the
buyers do not have any incentive to participate with the entrant. Some papers exam-
ine exclusive dealing allowing multihoming on both sides and the differentiation between
platforms (Carroni et al., 2021; Choi, 2010; Ishihara and Oki, 2021). Choi (2010) assumes
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the amount of exclusive content and multihoming content on each platform is exogenously
given. Carroni et al. (2021) and Ishihara and Oki (2021) endogenize the content providers’
choice regarding their exclusive dealing; however, Carroni et al. (2021) focus on exclusive
provision of popular content, and Ishihara and Oki (2021) analyze the monopoly content
provider’s incentive to supply its content exclusively to platforms. We complement these
papers by examining a platform’s decision on how many sellers to which it offers exclusive
contracts. We contribute to the literature by characterizing the optimal choice and its
welfare impact with the magnitude of network externalities and stand-alone benefits of
platforms.
The second strand comprises papers on the effect of agents’ multihoming on compe-
tition and welfare in two-sided markets (Athey et al., 2018; Bakos and Halaburda, 2020;
Belleflamme and Peitz, 2019; Bryan and Gans, 2019; Liu et al., 2020). The present paper
applies the partial multihoming equilibrium of Bakos and Halaburda (2020) to a two-
sided market model where sellers and buyers arrive sequentially. The result of Bakos and
Halaburda (2020) that the prices to both sides are positive in the partial multihoming
equilibrium is also true in our model. Moreover, their partial multihoming equilibrium
eliminates the dependency between strategic variables of two platforms, which also sim-
plifies the derivation of equilibrium. Belleflamme and Peitz (2019) compare the price
structure when agents on both sides singlehome with that when buyers singlehome and
sellers partially multihome. They find that the sellers’ shift from partial multihoming
to singlehoming may be beneficial to buyers and harmful to sellers. They also show that
platforms have incentives to induce sellers to singlehome when their intrinsic utility to join
platforms is low. In our paper, exclusive contracts on the seller side may be preferable
to buyers even though prices to buyers are raised. Exclusivity on the seller side urges
buyers to multihome, and this may benefit buyers because they enjoy more interactions
with sellers in addition to stand-alone benefits from multiple platforms.
2 Model
Consider a market where two platforms intermediate interactions between agents from
two sides, k = {s, b}: the seller side and the buyer side. Each platform i = {1, 2} sets
fixed participation fees pi to the seller side and qi to the buyer side. Sellers and buyers are
uniformly distributed respectively along a Hotelling line whose length is one, at the two
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extreme points of which two platforms are located; platform 1 is located at point 0 of the
Hotelling line, and platform 2 is located at point 1.
We allow sellers and buyers to join both platforms (multihoming) in addition to joining
only one platform (singlehoming). An agent of side k located at x ∈ [0, 1] obtains a surplus














u1k = vk + βk(n1l + nMl)− tkx− f1k,
u2k = vk + βk(n2l + nMl)− tk(1− x)− f2k,
uMk = (1 + θk)vk + βk(n1l + n2l + nMl)− tk − (f1k + f2k),
(1)
where, vk (> 0) denotes the stand-alone value, which is common to the two platforms,
and θkvk, where θk ∈ (0, 1) is the stand-alone value from a second platform; βk (> 0) is
the network effect that comes from the number of agents who join the other side of the
platform; nil denotes the number of side l ̸= k agents who join platform i only, and nMl
denotes the number of side l ̸= k agents who multihome; tk (> 0) is the transportation
cost, fik is participation fee and fis = pi and fib = qi. Note that this utility function
assumes that there is no “double counting” of the network effect. In other words, the
agents cannot gain additional network benefits when they meet the agents on the second
platform if they have met the same agents on the first platform. On the other hand,
it assumes “partial double counting” of the stand-alone value of platforms; agents who
multihome gain the stand-alone benefit multiplied by θk on the second platform.
We examine a situation in which platform 1 can present an offer of an exclusive contract
to sellers. Once sellers have signed the exclusive contract with platform 1, they cannot
participate in platform 2. Usually, a platform might set a special sale price for an exclusive
contract or pass on a subsidy. However, for tractability, we fix the price for the exclusive
contract at zero. Furthermore, we assume that platform 1 offers exclusive contracts to n̂
sellers close to platform 1; sellers on the interval [0, n̂] receive the offer. The profits of
platforms 1 and 2 are as follows, respectively,
π1 = p1(n1s − n̂+ nMs) + q1(n1b + nMb),
π2 = p2(n2s + nMs) + q2(n2b + nMb).
(2)
We set the timing of the game as follows.
1. Platform 1 presents an offer of an exclusive contract to sellers who are located at
7
x ∈ [0, n̂] with a free participation fee. The sellers who receive the offer decide
whether to accept or decline it.
2. Platforms 1 and 2 set participation fees, p1 and p2, respectively, to sellers not under
exclusive contracts. The sellers decide which platform(s) to join.
3. Platforms 1 and 2 set participation fees, q1 and q2, respectively, to buyers. Buyers
decide which platform(s) to join.
We assume that sellers and buyers visit the market sequentially. This timing is pro-
posed by Hagiu (2006) to illustrate the video game markets. In stage 2, sellers compare
utilities of joining platform 1, 2, and multihoming with each other given their expectations
of the number of buyers on each platform. We assume that their expectations are fulfilled
in equilibrium.
3 Analysis
We focus on the equilibrium where partial multihoming exists on the buyer side. We also
focus on cases in which, thanks to the stand-alone value, vb, even if platform 1 enters into
exclusive contracts with all sellers in stage 1, platform 2 can still make a profit if it can
acquire buyers. We solve the game by backward induction.
3.1 Stage 3
Given the number of sellers on each platform, n1s, n2s, and nMs, and participation fees
to buyers, q1 and q2, we first consider the buyers’ participating decisions. We also assume
that all sellers are participating in at least one platform. Comparing u1b , u
2
b , and u
M
b , we
characterize three points where indifferent buyers are located. First, the buyer who is
indifferent between joining only platform 1 and multihoming is located at 6
y1M (q2, n2s) ≡ 1−
θbvb + βbn2s − q2
tb
. (3)
This y1M is characterized by u1b(y
1M ) = uMb (y
1M ). Buyers who are located to the left of
y1M prefer joining only platform 1 to multihoming. Second, the buyer who is indifferent
6Here, we use y to denote the indifferent buyers because we use x to denote the indifferent sellers in
the following section.
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Figure 1: Partial multihoming on both sides.
between multihoming and joining only platform 2 is located at
yM2(q1, n1s) ≡
θbvb + βbn1s − q1
tb
. (4)
Similarly, this is derived from uMb (y
M2) = u2b(y
M2). Third, the buyer who is indifferent
between joining only platform 1 and joining only platform 2 is located at
y12(q1, q2, n1s, n2s) ≡
1
2
− (βbn2s − q2)− (βbn1s − q1)
2tb
, (5)
which is characterized by u1b(y
12) = u2b(y
12). Partial multihoming arises on the buyer side
when 0 < y1M ≤ y12 ≤ yM2 < 1. If this condition holds, buyers who are located at
y ∈ [0, y1M ] participate in only platform 1, buyers at y ∈ [y1M , yM2] participate in both
platforms, and buyers at y ∈ [yM2, 1] participate in only platform 2, which is illustrated
in Figure 1. Therefore, n1b = y
1M , nMb = y
M2 − y1M and n2b = 1− yM2.
Next, we consider the platforms’ pricing decisions for buyers. The two platforms set




π1 = p1(n1s − n̂+ nMs) + q1{yM2(q1, n1s)},
max
q2
π2 = p2(n2s + nMs) + q2{1− y1M (q2, n2s)},
(6)










θbvb + βbn2s − 2q2
tb
= 0. (7)









From the first-order conditions and the optimal prices, given the situation of partial mul-
tihoming, we confirm that the prices for buyers are proportional only to the number of
their own exclusive sellers, nis, and they do not depend on the number of multihoming
sellers. Therefore, platforms have an incentive to increase their number of exclusive sellers
even if they cannot collect fees from them. Substituting the above prices into (3) and (4)
and n1b = y
1M and n2b = 1− yM2, we derive the number of buyers on each platform as
n1b(n2s) = y









and nMb(n1s, n2s) = 1−n1b(n2s)−n2b(n1s). It is notable that ∂nMb/∂n1s = ∂nMb/∂n2s =
βb/2tb. This indicates that the exclusive sellers on each platform prompt buyers to mul-
tihome.7
3.1.1 Fully exclusive dealing equilibrium
If all sellers sign an exclusive contract with platform 1 in Stage 1, that is n̂ = 1, then we
skip Stage 2 because platforms no longer compete for sellers. We can derive the equilibrium
results by substituting n1s = 1 and n2s = nMs = 0 into the above prices. We call this



















In this equilibrium, platform 1 attracts (θbvb+βb)/2tb buyers, and platform 2 attracts
(θbvb)/2tb buyers. Furthermore, because platform 1 incorporates all sellers, it can collect
higher participation fees from more buyers due to the network effect, βb.
3.2 Stage 2
As in the previous subsection, we next consider the sellers’ decisions to join platforms
and platforms’ pricing strategies for sellers. Because n̂ sellers have signed the exclusive
7This characteristic is in keeping with what is stated by Ishihara and Oki (2021).
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contract with platform 1, the two platforms compete for sellers located at x ∈ (n̂, 1] in
Stage 2. As in the buyers’ case, we specify three indifferent sellers by comparing u1s, u
2
s,
and uMs . The seller who is indifferent between joining only platform 1 and multihoming
is located at





The seller who is indifferent between multihoming and joining only platform 2 is located
at





Finally, the seller who is indifferent between joining only platform 1 and joining only





2b − ne1b)− (p2 − p1)
2ts
. (14)
In the above equations, neib is the seller’s expectation of the number of buyers who join only
platform i. We assume that the expectations are fulfilled in equilibrium; ne
1b = n1b(n2s)
and ne
2b = n2b(n1s) in (9).
3.2.1 Nonexclusive dealing equilibrium
First, we consider the case when platform 1 does not have any exclusive contracts with
sellers, n̂ = 0. As well as the buyer side, we focus on the equilibrium in which there is
partial multihoming on the seller side, which arises when 0 < x1M ≤ x12 ≤ xM2 < 1. At
that time, we derive n1s, n2s, and nMs by substituting n1s = x




2tb(ts − βs + p2 − θsvs + βsθbvb/2tb)
2tbts − βbβs
,
nN2s(p1) = 1− xM2(p1) =
2tb(ts − βs + p1 − θsvs + βsθbvb/2tb)
2tbts − βbβs
,
nNMs = 1− nN1s(p2)− nN2s(p1).
(15)
The superscript N represents results in a nonexclusive dealing equilibrium. Next, the two





π1 = p1{1− nN2s(p1)}+ q1(nN1s(p2)){1− n2b(nN1s(p2))},
max
p2
π2 = p2{1− nN1s(p2)}+ q2(nN2s(p1)){1− n1b(nN2s(p1))}.
(16)
The first-order conditions are
∂π1
∂p1









The best response functions of the two are irrelevant to each other. The equilibrium prices










4tbts − βbβs − 2tb(βs + θsvs) + βsθbvb
4tbts − βbβs
. (19)










(4tbts − βbβs)(2tb − βb − θbvb) + 2θsvstbβb
4tb(2tbtsβbβs)
. (21)





















3.2.2 Partial exclusive dealing equilibrium
Next, we consider the case when n̂ ∈ (0, 1). In this case, the platforms’ pricing problems
become slightly complicated. Platform 1 can control xM2 through p1. Depending on the
mutual size relationship between xM2, given n̂, and x = 1, the demand function on the
seller side for platform 1 will change. We focus on the equilibrium where x1M ≤ xM2. As
long as n̂ ≤ x1M ≤ xM2—we will confirm later that this occurs in the equilibrium—the
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2s(p1) if p1 ≤
2tb(βs + θsvs)− βsθbvb − 2tbts
2tb
≡ p̄1,
0 if p̄1 < p1.
(22)
p̄1 is the price at which x
M2 = 1; in other words, there are nonexclusive sellers on platform
2. Similarly, platform 2 can control x1M through p2, and the relationship between x
1M and
n̂ affects the demand for platform 2. The number of sellers who participate in platform 2







n̂ if p2 ≤




1s(p2) if p̄2 < p2.
(23)
p̄2 is the price at which x
1M = n̂. Note that platform 2 does not lower p2 than p̄2 because
it cannot gain more sellers from such pricing. We provide the detailed procedures for
solving these pricing problems in the appendix. We summarize the subgame equilibrium
with given n̂ as the following lemma.
Lemma 1
In Stage 2, given n̂, platform 1 and platform 2 set their participation fees and the conse-
quent relationship between indifferent points becomes as follows.
• (p1, p2) = (p
∗(n̂), pN2 ) and n̂ < x
1M < xM2 < 1 when n̂ ∈ [0, n̄A),
• (p1, p2) = (p
∗(n̂), p̄2) and n̂ = x
1M < xM2 < 1 when n̂ ∈ [n̄A, n̄B),
• (p1, p2) = (p̄1, p̄2) and n̂ = x
1M < xM2 = 1 when n̂ ∈ [n̄B, 1),
where













In Stage 1, platform 1 determines the number of sellers to whom it will offer exclusive
contracts. Sellers who sign the agreement can join platform 1 for free. Each seller has no
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incentive to decline the offer of an exclusive contract unless they are offered a negative
price in Stage 2.















p∗(n̂){1− n2s(p∗(n̂))− n̂}+ q1(nN1s){1− n2b(nN1s)} if 0 ≤ n̂ < n̄A
p∗(n̂){1− n2s(p∗(n̂))− n̂}+ q1(n̂){1− n2b(n̂)} if n̄A ≤ n̂ < n̄B
p∗(n̂){1− n̂}+ q1(n̂){1− n2b(n̂)} if n̄B ≤ n̂ ≤ 1
(25)
This profit function is continuous and π1(0) = π
N
1
and π1(1) = π
F
1
. We use Mathematica






(2(2tbts − βbβs)(βs(βb + θbvb)− 2tb(βs + θsvs))2






Hereafter, to characterize platform 1’s optimal choice, suppose the two sides are symmetric
except for the stand-alone values of platforms and the network benefits per user on the
other side; βs = 1, tb = ts = 1, and θb = θs = 1/2. We further assume that the rest
of the parameters, βb, vb, and vs, take values in which partial multihoming arises on the
buyer side in n̂ = 0 equilibrium and in n̂ = 1 equilibrium. With these assumptions, we
summarize platform 1’s choice as Proposition 1.
Proposition 1
Suppose βs = 1, tb = ts = 1, and θb = θs = 1/2. If βb is sufficiently low, then platform
1 does not offer exclusive contracts to sellers (nonexclusive dealing). On the other hand,
if βb is sufficiently high, then platform 1 offers exclusive contracts to all the sellers (fully
exclusive dealing). If βb is mid-level, platform 1 chooses nonexclusivity or full exclusivity
depending on vb and vs; specifically,
• if βb < 5−
√
21 ≃ 0.42, then n̂ = 0 is chosen for all vb and vs,
• if βb > 2(
√
2− 1) ≃ 0.83, then n̂ = 1 is chosen for all vb and vs,
• if 5 −
√
21 ≤ βb ≤ 2(
√
2 − 1), platform 1 chooses n̂ = 0 or n̂ = 1 depending on vb


























Figure 2: Optimal choices of platform 1 when βb = 0.55 (left panel)
and when βb = 0.7 (right panel).
Fully exclusive dealing always decreases platform 2’s profit.
As depicted in Figure 2, fully exclusive dealing is chosen when vs is low, and vb is high.
This result is intuitive. Low vs means that platforms cannot generate much revenue on
the seller side, and high vb means that the platforms can generate much revenue on the
buyer side. Therefore, platform 1 gives up the revenue on the seller side and surrounds
the sellers with free offers to earn the revenue on the buyer side. Sufficiently high βb is
similar to this situation; buyers come to value the number of sellers very strongly and pay
high participation fees. In contrast, nonexclusive dealing is selected when vs is high, and
vb is low. Platform 1 does not want to give up the revenue on the seller side because vs is
high. Moreover, even if platform 1 locks in sellers, it will not be able to make much money
on the buyer side with low vb. Platform 1 realizes that it is better to compete quietly at
that time. When βb is sufficiently low, nonexclusivity is profitable for platform 1 with the
same logic.





dealing increases the number of multihoming buyers; however, it decreases the total num-
ber of buyers on platform 2. Moreover, it lowers platform 2’s price to buyers because of the
disappearance of sellers from platform 2. Fully exclusive dealing is harmful to platform 2
compared with nonexclusive dealing.
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4 Welfare Analysis
Finally, in this section, we study the effects of exclusive contracts between platforms and
sellers on consumer surplus (CS) and total surplus (TS). As in the previous section, we
assume βs = 1, tb = ts = 1, and θb = θs = 1/2.
First, we break down CS into seller surplus (CSs) and buyer surplus (CSb). In nonex-






















































vb + βb(1− nN1s)− tb(1− y)− qN2
}
dy,
and consumer surplus is CSN = CSNs + CS
N





































and CSF = CSFs +CS
F
b . Comparing these, we derive the following lemma about consumer
surplus.
Lemma 2
The surplus of sellers is always improved when platform 1 makes fully exclusive contracts.
Moreover, with fully exclusive contracts, the surplus of buyers is improved when βb >
√
14− 2 ≃ 1.74; and consumer surplus is improved when βb < 3−
√
5 ≃ 0.76 or βb > β̄b ≃
1.20.
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The conditions in Lemma 2 are sufficient conditions; they hold for all vs and vb. For the
range of βb for which no sufficient condition exists, one example is depicted in the left and
center panels of Figure 3. In our model, sellers are always better-off with fully exclusive
dealing. With fully exclusive dealing, the decrease in platform 1’s price always counteracts
the loss of the stand-alone benefits from platform 2.
Remarkably, as well as seller surplus, buyer surplus and consumer surplus might also
increase with full exclusivity. There are two separate mechanisms by which exclusive
dealing improves consumer surplus. The first is related to the stand-alone values. Full
exclusivity increases multihomers on the buyer side and prompts them to enjoy the stand-
alone value from two platforms; on the other hand, it prevents sellers from doing so.
When vb is high and vs is low, the former effect outweighs the latter, and exclusive dealing
improves consumer surplus. The second relates to the network benefits. Full exclusivity
brings all sellers together and enables buyers to interact with them on one platform.
When βb is high, this effect becomes large, and exclusive dealing is welfare-enhancing.
Even though fully exclusive dealing raises platform 1’s price and the sum of the two
platforms’ prices on the buyer side, buyer surplus and consumer surplus can improve
when the network benefit or the stand-alone value on the buyer side is high.
Consumer surplus is also improved by full exclusivity when βb is sufficiently low. This
is because when βb is low, the increase in platform 1’s price to buyers becomes moderate.
Although the contribution of full exclusivity to the network benefits on the buyer side
becomes small, the contribution to the stand-alone values and the increase in seller surplus
remain. Therefore, as a whole, consumer surplus improves with full exclusivity even when
βb is sufficiently low.
Finally, we consider the effect of exclusive dealing on total surplus. We define total









. Comparing these reveals that total surplus
increases with fully exclusive contracts when βb is high and decrease when βb is low.
Proposition 2
Total surplus is improved with full exclusivity when βb > β̃b ≃ 1.14. On the other hand,
total surplus is worse-off when βb < 2/3.
The conditions are sufficient conditions, and, if βb ∈ (2/3, β̃b), the effect on total
surplus depends on vs and vb as illustrated in Figure 3. Comparing Figures 2 and 3, we


































Figure 3: Preferable choices for buyers’ surplus (left panel), con-
sumer surplus (center panel), and total surplus (right panel) when
βb = 1.
surplus. Proposition 1, Lemma 2, and Proposition 2 together demonstrate that when βb
is sufficiently high, full exclusivity is preferable for total surplus and consumer surplus,
and is implemented by platform 1 in practice. On the other hand, if βb is sufficiently low,
platform 1 does not make any exclusive contracts, and this selection is not preferable for
consumer surplus but is preferable for total surplus.
We have assumed that βs = 1. Therefore, Proposition 2 states that if βb is somewhat
higher than βs, then exclusive dealing is welfare-enhancing; on the other hand, if βb is
sufficiently lower than βs, exclusive dealing is detrimental to social welfare. Thus, when
considering the regulation of exclusive contracts in two-sided markets, it might be an
essential perspective that the agents on one side derive more network benefits per agent
than those on the other side.
5 Conclusion
In this study, we examine the platform’s decision regarding exclusive dealing with sellers
and its impact on social welfare in a two-sided market model where multihoming is allowed
on both sides. We show that a platform that can choose the number of sellers to whom it
offers exclusive contracts will offer exclusive contracts to all sellers or none at all. Which of
these strategies the platform chooses depends on several parameters. In previous studies
dealing with exclusive contracts in two-sided markets, the choice of exclusive contracts is
determined uniquely in the models. We contribute to the literature by characterizing the
optimal choice with network effects and stand-alone values on two sides.
Our findings on the impact of exclusive dealing on social welfare have several prac-
tical implications. First, a ban on exclusive dealing might harm social welfare as well
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as consumer surplus. Exclusive dealing on the seller side increases the number of multi-
homers on the buyer side, leading to more interactions at a single platform. An increase
in multihoming buyers itself also improves welfare because they derive stand-alone values
from both platforms. Therefore, exclusive dealing may improve social welfare even though
it may reduce the rival platforms’ profit. The welfare-enhancing mechanism of exclusive
dealing in our model differs from those shown in previous studies. Second, giving free rein
to platforms may result in preferable consequences regarding social welfare. As expected,
platforms would like to make exclusive contracts with more sellers to extract buyers’ sur-
plus when buyers greatly appreciate more sellers. This is also welfare-enhancing because
buyers enjoy considerable interaction with sellers. On the other hand, when buyers do not
acknowledge the value of buyers as much, platforms do not offer exclusive contracts so as
to make a profit on the seller side. To make fewer buyers multihoming is efficient at that
time.
These results depend on the assumption that there is multihoming on both sides. We
must also consider the importance of some assumptions in our model. One is that exclusive
contracts have a zero price. Exclusive contracts could be concluded at a discounted positive
price or at a negative price (subsidy). We show that a platform makes fully exclusive
contracts at a zero fee. Allowing the platform to set the price for exclusive dealing as
it likes will contribute to the literature on price discrimination in two-sided markets as
well as the literature on exclusive contracts. Another is the assumption that only one
platform can make exclusive contracts. Using this assumption, we consider markets where
there is a dominant incumbent and a new entrant. However, exclusive dealing can be an
effective strategy not only for existing firms trying to block entry, but also for new firms
attempting to enter the market. Considering a situation in which many firms can offer
exclusive contracts would significantly change the form of competition, but it may be an
interesting extension.
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Brühn, Tim and Georg Götz (2018) “Exclusionary practices in two-sided markets: The
effect of radius clauses on competition between shopping centers,” Managerial and De-
cision Economics, Vol. 39, No. 5, pp. 577–590.
Bryan, Kevin A. and Joshua S. Gans (2019) “A theory of multihoming in rideshare com-
petition,” Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 89–96.
Caillaud, Bernard and Bruno Jullien (2001) “Competing Cybermediaries,” European Eco-
nomic Review, Vol. 45, pp. 797–808.
(2003) “Chicken & Egg: Competition among Intermediation Service Providers,”
The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 34, No. 2, pp. 309–328.
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